When the Bush Administration took office at the beginning of 2001, its instinctive approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was “hands-off.” In large measure, this was a function of President Bush’s desire to distance himself in every way possible from his predecessor, Bill Clinton. Clinton’s intense personal involvement in peacemaking and “micromanagement” of negotiations was seen as not only futile and even counterproductive, but also as debasing the prestige of the Presidency. The Bush people felt that Presidents should not be in the business of city planning and zoning, and since the circumstances for lower-level mediation were even less auspicious in 2001 than they had been during most of Clinton’s term of office, the new Administration was initially determined to stay away from this mess and focus, instead, on issues of greater strategic weight in the Persian Gulf.

However, like many other Administrations before it, this one soon realized that if it did not come to the Middle East, the Middle East would come to it. For George Bush, Jr., the realization came fairly soon. Escalating violence prompted growing demands for greater American involvement from the Palestinians, from Arab governments, and from many European countries. The Administration’s first response was to endorse the conclusions of the Mitchell Committee. This was a Clinton legacy, and the Administration had little choice in the matter. But it did choose to go beyond verbal approval and dispatched CIA Director George Tenet to the region to try to work out modalities for implementing Mitchell.

It is therefore incorrect to argue that the Bush Administration has been altogether indifferent from the very outset. It is true, however, that it did not engage very forcefully or enthusiastically, and when Tenet’s efforts failed to produce any tangible results, the Administration reverted to its initial posture and felt that it could stand aside until the parties themselves decided to create more favorable conditions for American intervention.

That changed after September 11, because the United States felt the need to cultivate Arab/Islamic goodwill and enlist Arab partners in the coalition against terrorism. As a result, the Administration adopted a more pro-active stance. Both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell outlined broad visions of a peace settlement that were fairly sympathetic to Palestinian aspirations, the State Department called on Israel to exercise restraint in dealing with the violence, and the U.S. nominated a team of special emissaries – retired General Anthony Zinni and Assistant Secretary of State William Burns – to mediate an end to the violence and a resumption of negotiations. Such measures raised concern in the Israeli Government that the U.S. intended to build its anti-terror coalition at Israel’s expense, even prompting Prime Minister Sharon to warn against appeasement in a speech with invidious references to Munich.

In fact, any American tendency that might have existed to respond to demands for greater involvement in the sense intended by Arabs and Europeans, i.e., greater pressure on Israel, was quickly derailed. This was not due to anything Sharon said or did. Instead, it can be attributed to two other causes. The first was the behavior of the Palestinians, and particularly the Palestinian Authority. Destructive suicide bombings in Israeli cities on the very weekend of Zinni’s visit, and subsequent meetings with the Palestinian leadership, convinced the Americans that Yasir Arafat’s protestations of determination to suppress violence were not credible. Arafat’s trustworthiness in American eyes was further undermined by the Karine-A affair, not just because of the smuggling itself, but also because of the Iranian connection. The Americans therefore concluded that they had no obligation to pull Arafat’s chestnuts out of the fire. The second cause was the realization, after the success of operations in Afghanistan, that Arab cooperation, at least in that phase of the war against terrorism, had been neither forthcoming nor particularly necessary.

As a result of these developments, the considerations that had undermined the Administration’s instinct to stay out were neutralized, and it reverted to its original tendency. In practice, this meant an endorsement of Sharon’s insistence on an end to violence (“security”) before the political track (negotiations) could be revived. It also meant few American restrictions on the way Israel conducted its military campaign – the only major exception being a commitment not to harm Arafat or bring about the collapse of the PA.

It is beyond the scope to this paper to judge whether or not the American approach is best designed to bring about an end to the violence, or whether there is anything other than massive, forceful American involvement that can accomplish that end. But it is worthwhile asking how likely it is that this U.S. approach will persist and what, if anything, might produce another policy shift.

The first point to mention is that though the President’s authority to decide on policy matters is unchallenged, his decisions are almost always the outcome of debates between contending ideas or schools of thought. In this instance, the “hard-line” (i.e., uncompromising demand to deal first with Palestinian violence) is represented by Vice President Dick Cheney and the Defense Department (Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz), who are inclined to lump Palestinian violence together with all others forms of terrorism and to see Arafat, himself, as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. Powell and the State Department, in general, are believed to lean more to the kind of “political” approach that disturbed Sharon after September 11. National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice is thought to oscillate between these two poles.

The second point is that the balance of influence between these schools is itself influenced by other elements in the American government (especially Congress), by public opinion, and by broader political-strategic factors. Congress and public opinion have thus far remained quite supportive of Israeli government preferences. In the United States, as opposed to Europe, the issues of Palestinian violence and the correct way to deal with it are still viewed more through the prism of terrorism than through the prism of national liberation. But these factors, which reinforce the Cheney-Rumsfeld school of thought, could change if one or more of several things happen:

the Palestinians consistently restrict their violence to the West Bank and Gaza, and especially to military personnel;

the Palestinians and/or the Arabs come up with a serious and credible peace proposal;

Israel makes major operational blunders that produce intolerable numbers or levels of civilian casualties and/or suffering.

The other possible source of change is a redefinition of the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian issue to America’s broader regional or global agenda. In particular, an American decision to launch a major campaign against Iraq will require efforts to cultivate Arab governments and public opinion, particularly if the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation continues to escalate to the point where it not only further inflames anti-Americanism but threatens to undermine domestic stability in major Arab countries or even physically spill across their borders. Such efforts will almost certainly include the appearance (if not the substance) of more active American involvement to end the violence AND promote a political settlement that meets the minimal expectations of the Palestinians.