This paper presents a brief review the plan's fundamentals and features.

The fundamental assumption behind the plan is the impossibility of a resumption of political negotiations, whether toward an interim or permanent status agreement. A second assumption is that continuation of the current situation or, alternatively, retaking of Area A in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is irreconcilable with Israel’s long-term interests and endangers Israel’s security and perhaps its very existence.

Supporters of the plan have concluded that with no solution in sight, Israel must take unilateral steps that require its withdrawal from most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and construction of a new, so-called temporary border to separate Israel from the Palestinians. Some of the plan’s supporters view this border as demarcating the present configuration of the Palestinian Authority while others are prepared to encou

rage recognition of the border as delineating the outlines of a Palestinian state.

This border to be unilaterally drawn by Israel will abide with the following parameters: control of minimal Palestinian population in the territories in tandem with full control of settlements so that about 80% of all settlers will remain in Israeli-held territories; control of Jerusalem — including East Jerusalem — according to its current municipal boundaries; control of additional areas as “bargaining chips” to be used in future negotiations toward a permanent status agreement; optimal reduction of the length of the border between the Palestinian entity and the State of Israel; and creation of a sealed border to prevent free Palestinian traffic and thereby hinder entry of terrorists into Israel.

One of the groups promoting this plan recommends the addition of an international component by inviting a US-led multinational body to accept the territories that will be vacated for an interim period until their transfer to the Palestinians in the context of a permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. This body would also allocate a military force to serve as a buffer between Israel and the Palestinian Authority/state, and is to be located on the Palestinian side of the border.

According to supporters of the plan, its primary benefits are:

• An end to the occupation, in essence, of Palestinian territories by Israel. Such a move would reduce opportunities for direct contact and friction between the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the Palestinian populace for the sake of creating a sense of “We are here and they are there.”
• Elimination of the demographic threat arising from control over a Palestinian population that may become the majority if the Greater Land of Israel concept is retained.
• Reinforced levels of security.
• Potential international recognition of the new border as a temporary international border.
• Conversion of a national or ethnic conflict into a territorial conflict between two sovereign states.
• Presence of a multinational force to provide stability to the Palestinians and security to Israel.
• International legitimisation of the move conducive to its recognition as a preliminary interim arrangement.

Opponents of the plan are found along the entire spectrum of Israel's political and ideological camps. Right-wing objectors argue against unilateral separation, which they believe will sabotage realisation of their vision of the Greater Land of Israel while it encourages establishment of a Palestinian state, a condition endangering Israel's existence.

Centre-left censure of the plan is based on a different set of factors:

• IDF withdrawal resulting from Palestinian pressure will lead to the conclusion that Israel can be compelled to make concessions by means of violence and terrorism.
• Unilateral withdrawal will collapse the concept of peace in the Middle East based on UN Resolution 242 and the land-for-peace formula.
• To implement the plan, dozens if not tens of dozens of settlements would have to be removed, actions whose probability of success is close to nil. The Israeli public will agree to dismantle of settlements only in exchange for tangible gains in the form of a peace agreement and declaration of an end to the conflict, moves obviated by unilateral withdrawal.
• The Palestinians will never accept a unilateral Israeli delineation of their borders.
• The territory remaining under Israeli control would be considered by the Palestinians and the Arab world, and perhaps also by Europe, as a sort of security zone ? la southern Lebanon. The Palestinian objective would then be to oust all Israelis from this strip and thereby eliminate the option of the continued presence of settlements in the area within the context of a peace agreement.
• At least 300,000-350,000 Palestinians (about 250,000 in eastern Jerusalem and the rest in Area B within extensive settlement territory) would remain under Israeli control. This population will refuse to accept Israeli rule and become more militant. Considering no physical border will separate this population from Israel, it will be a simple matter for terrorists to cross the Green Line and perpetrate acts of violence.
• There are physical, geographic impediments to implementing a unilateral separation in the Jerusalem environs, which would become the weak point in the most sensitive area in Israel.
• In order to continue to safeguard Kiryat Arba and the Jewish quarter in Hebron, Israel would have to create a hazardous corridor leading to the area and to continue to control part of Arab Hebron with its tens of thousands of residents.
• Construction of a hermetic fence along the entire length of the border, including the sparsely populated mountainous regions such as Mount Hebron and other areas having a complex topographical terrain, is so complicated that some experts consider it an impossible task. Furthermore, Israel lacks the capacity to maintain a uniform level of security along the entire length of such a fence. Hence, it will always be possible for a lone terrorist to slip through. In any case, the cost of construction is huge (billions of shekels) and the capability for continuous high-level maintenance is negligible.
• Separation would accelerate economic decline in the Palestinian territories, leading to religious extremism and social disintegration, conditions that would ultimately rebound against Israel. Hermetic separation would also encourage the Palestinians turn to Egypt and Jordan at the cost of normalisation with Israel and democratisation, trends reinforced by interaction between the populations.
• It is highly unlikely that a multinational force will be prepared to serve as a human buffer between the parties in the absence of an enforceable agreement.