In March 1999, two months before the national elections to be held on 17 May, no single candidate running for the office of prime minister has yet to capture the support of a clear majority of the electorate. The contest between Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud) and Ehud Barak (Labour) is very close, each with about 35% of the potential vote. The third major candidate, Yitzchak Mordechai, Netanyahu’s former Minister of Defence and now the chairman of the Center Party, appears to have captured support of about 18% of the electorate, with Benny Begin (right wing) drawing about 4%. According to recent polls, 10% of the total electorate is undecided.

As the incumbent, Prime Minister Netanyahu has clear advantages, resting in his control over the public agenda, particularly a possible withdrawal from Lebanon or the renewal of talks with Syria. Alternatively, any event that might undermine the public’s sense of personal security, such as a terrorist attack, would seriously impede his chances for reelection and improve those of Barak and Mordechai. Furthermore, the appearance of former supporters and members of his government among the opposition’s ranks (e.g., former ministers David Levi, Dan Meridor and Benny Begin), are clear reminders of the disaffection with his leadership.

The disintegration of the political hegemony of the two major political parties, the Likud and Labour, has intensified. What was formerly touted as electoral reform —separate elections for the prime minister and Knesset representatives — has increased political factionalism.

The burgeoning number of splinter parties likely to be elected to the Knesset will make it difficult to form a stable government after the elections. One possible solution to the impasse is the creation of a national unity government, irrespective of who is elected prime minister. Netanyahu and Barak may announce their intentions to form such a government before the elections in order to improve their electoral prospects. Supporting this option is the Israeli public’s growing readiness to restructure national politics so as to eliminate the power small religious parties have traditionally exercised over the construction of the government (see the last page for a table listing expected Knesset election results). Paradoxically, the electorate’s recognition of a national unity government as its sole defence against an unending round of elections is deterring voters from expressing a clear preference for either front-runner.

The forecast is that Labour’s alliance (“One Israel”) will represent the largest bloc in the new Knesset. A national unity government would be composed of the leading members of the Labour, Likud, and the Center Party.

The quandaries underlying the choice of prime minister are reflected in the predictions being made as to which candidate will triumph if a second round of elections (that is, if no one candidate wins more than 50% of the vote) is held. Put simply, Barak is expected to gain over Netanyahu in the first round, but not in the second; Mordechai is expected to gain over Netanyahu in the second round, but not in the first. The core of the problem rests in the demographic and sectoral transformations undergone by Israeli society. Labour continues to represent the Israeli elite in the minds of much of the electorate. The Likud has traditionally geared itself toward other segments of the population. Although the Center Party may contain defectors from both major parties, Yitzchak Mordechai, its chairman, was chosen for this role because he is acceptable by Likud supporters and therefore is believed to have the greatest potential to triumph over Netanyahu in the second round.

The Likud’s campaign is two-pronged. The first, emphasising the party’s platform somewhat more than its candidate, attempts to convince voters that Barak will readily concede to Palestinian demands for additional transfers of land. The other prong emphasises Netanyahu’s image as a “strong” leader, as opposed to the “weak” Barak, portrayed as willing to compromise Israel’s security interests. Netanyahu’s strategy advantageously utilises the term “leftist” that, in Israel’s political lexicon, continues to arouse scorn among significant portions of the population (i.e., Sephardim, the orthodox, and new immigrants). Its disadvantages lies in Netanyahu’s actions, such as his partial compliance with the Oslo accords and his signing of the Wye Agreement.

Barak’s campaign is also two-pronged. First, he is trying to deflect the public debate away from security issues. Barak is quite sensitive to how difficult it is to counteract Netanyahu’s ability to incite Israeli fears concerning security; therefore, he has turned to internal issues, such as the high rate of unemployment. Shlomo Ben-Ami, won first place in the Labour party primaries, and the addition of Davi Levi (both of Moroccan origin) to his team is contributing Barak’s attempts to project an image of the socially responsible political leader. The second prong of Barak’s campaign is focused on Netanyahu’s character, which has been severely and consistently discredited by many of his former colleagues. It remains to be seen whether Labour will be successful in overcoming the Likud’s message that Netanyahu is the only candidate “strong” enough to steer Israel through this critical point in its history. In 1996, Labour’s attempts to persuade the Israeli public that prosperity could be bought only with peace were visibly unsuccessful.

Mordechai is directing his campaign at Likud supporters disaffected with Netanyahu. He is avoiding divisive issues and emphasising internal conciliation and harmony. As the election approaches, he will also underscore that he is the only candidate capable of overcoming Netanyahu. Mordechai’s position is being bolstered by Dan Meridor, in third place on the Center Party’s list. Meridor is identified with the norms of good government, perceived as lacking in Netanyahu’s management of the state, and the reason why Meridor resigned as Minister of Finance in 1997.