The Oslo Agreements (Oslo 1: The Declaration of Principles, September 1993; and Oslo 2: The Interim Agreement, September 1995) laid the foundations for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. They also determined the procedures for maintaining relations between the sides during the interim period.

The Declaration of Principles (DOP), a 17-page document, establishes the guidelines for negotiations and for any subsequent agreements to be signed. The Interim Agreement, a 314-page document, presents a very detailed description of the entire scope of relations to be maintained between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), including the bilateral commitments made. The Interim Agreement was based in part on the Gaza-Jericho Agreement signed in May 1994.

A fundamental working assumption of the Oslo Agreements is that beyond the written documents, deep-seated reconciliation and the end of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians are inherent to the process. It was assumed that this process would give birth to a mechanism that would steer the parties toward a compromise based on the renunciation of their maximal demands, a step recognised as difficult for both.

The interim period was planned to last five years. Its termination on 4 May 1999 was considered as the latest date requisite for concluding negotiations on the Permanent Status Agreement. In effect, the original timetable was not kept, and the current objective is to sign a Permanent Status Agreement in September 2000.

According to “Oslo”, the Permanent Status Agreement is to offer solutions to those pending issues - Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, the settlements, security arrangements, borders, diplomatic relations, and co-operation with neighbouring states, as well as other issues of mutual interest, such as water and economic relations - as noted in the Interim Agreement. These issues were intentionally left open.

On 15 January 1997, the Government of Israel, under Prime Minister Netanyahu, and the PLO signed the Hebron Protocol. This document outlines the security arrangements to be implemented after Israel’s redeployment in that city, the last to be vacated by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). An addendum to the Protocol, drafted and presented by the Americans and affirmed by the Israelis and the Palestinians, reiterates the two sides’ commitment to comply with the still unrealised obligations of the Interim Agreement. The Israelis agreed, among other things, to initiate implementation of the first further redeployment (FRD), release prisoners, open two safe passages, operate the Gaza Airport, and permit construction of a new seaport. The Palestinians promised to complete revision of the Palestinian Covenant, confiscate illegal weapons, adjust its police force to the scope specified in the agreements, and prevent anti-Israeli agitation and propaganda. Both sides have failed to fully implement their obligations.

The Wye Memorandum (October 1998), signed by Prime Minister Netanyahu is, in essence, an agreement to facilitate previous agreements. The Memorandum’s preamble speaks for itself. “The following are steps to facilitate implementation of the Interim Agreement...and other related agreements...so that the Israeli and Palestinian sides can more effectively carry out their reciprocal responsibilities”.

In the Memorandum, Israel agreed to transfer 13% of Area C (full Israeli control) to the PA. The bulk of this territory (the 13%) would become Area B (Palestinian jurisdiction over civil affairs, including responsibility for public order, with Israel retaining responsibility for security), with a small portion (1%) of the territory to become Area A (full Palestinian jurisdiction over civil and security matters). The Memorandum restructured the mechanism - or so it declared - for resolving the remaining issues of the Interim Agreement.

The bickering over each side’s degree of compliance ended only in May 1999, with the Israeli elections. The US government’s position has been that the PA has indeed abided by most if not all of its commitments, whereas Israel has reneged on the majority of its commitments.

Like the previous agreements, the Sharm-el-Sheik Memorandum, signed by Ehud Barak on 4 September 1999, is a tool meant to facilitate implementation of standing agreements.

Nevertheless, the Memorandum contributes to solving a number of important issues that have evolved due to the lack of implementation of the terms of the existing agreements and the fact that the previously agreed-upon timetable has not been kept. It is important to note here the implicit Palestinian commitment to abstain from unilaterally declaring a Palestinian State while the Interim Agreement is in effect. In addition, it is worthwhile noting Israel’s attempts to cope with the weighty issue of the third FRD (the last to be implemented according to the Interim Agreement). The Palestinian side agreed not to introduce any additional written demands into the document beyond merely mentioning the committee to deliberate on the subject. The Israelis hoped to incorporate the deliberations on the third FRD within the negotiations on the issue of the final border separating the two entities. In addition, the Sharm-el-Sheik Memorandum offered a new two-stage timetable for the Permanent Status Agreement: a framework agreement to be concluded in February 2000, the final agreement to be concluded in September 2000.

During the weeks following the signing of the Sharm-el-Sheik Memorandum, the two sides have made intensive efforts in their attempts to comply with the letter and spirit of the agreement. Following full compliance, the Palestinian Authority will extend over more than 41% of the West Bank, most of which will be designated as Area B.

However, accusations, some more substantial than others, made by each party concerning non-compliance will continue to hover in the background. The Palestinians, for example, have already devised a list of 32 items that still await Israeli implementation; Israel, on its part, has composed a similar list.

The main issue that may evolve into a serious obstacle is that of the third FRD. Israel has committed itself to implementing three further redeployments of IDF and security forces to specified military locations in the West Bank. By doing so, it will have completed its territorial obligations within the framework of the Interim Agreement.

In case the two sides do not reach an agreement on the territorial issue by February 2000, and/or the Palestinians begin to fear that Israel does not really intend to make a significant withdrawal within the framework of the Permanent Status Agreement, the Palestinians may reiterate their demands for the immediate implementation of the third FRD. The core issue remains how much of the 60% of Area C held by Israel to date will be eventually transferred to the Palestinians. None of the agreements explicitly determine the scope of the third FRD.

The official Palestinian interpretation of the Agreement states that at the end of the third FRD and before conclusion of the Permanent Status Agreement, Israel will exert control over only a limited area in the West Bank, covering East Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements and specified military locations. In contrast, the official Israel interpretation is significantly broader. The main assumption held by the Israeli negotiators who drew up the details of the Interim Agreement is that the territory to be under Palestinian control during the interim period would not extend beyond 50% of the West Bank, that is, an additional 10% is to be transferred within the confines of the third FRD. The Palestinians, however, have made an unofficial claim for more than 30%.

The debate will concentrate on the scope of the definitions — in territorial terms — that appear in the agreements as: the “WesBank and Gaza Strip territory except for issues that will be negotin the Permanent Status Negotiations...” “...including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-operation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest” will be under Palestinian control.

An historic opportunity for Israel and the Palestinians to fulfil their obligations under the Interim Agreement, to enter into serious and intensive negotiations over a Permanent Status Agreement, and to sign a peace treaty is now at hand.

Full compliance with the conditions of the agreements reviewed, accompanied by efforts to increase mutual trust, will reinforce commitment to finalise the difficult, intricate negotiations on the permanent status. The agreement will have to rest on a formula that will resolve all the pending issues, including the territorial issue, together with a bilateral declaration of the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the beginning of an historic reconciliation, and the dawn of an era of peace.